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Abstract: 
 
Working Title Films is arguably the most successful and well-known production 
company in Britain today. For over 30 years, it has produced a diverse range of critically 
and commercially successful British films including romantic comedies such as Four 
Weddings and a Funeral (1994) and Bridget Jones¶s Diary (2001), family films like 
Bean (1997) and Nanny McPhee (2005) and dramas including Atonement (2007) and 
The Theory of Everything (2014). For the majority of its history, however, Working 
Title has been defined in business terms by its status as a subsidiary of one of two 
multinational media conglomerates, PolyGram (1992±8) and Universal (1998±present). 
The transition between the two began when PolyGram, and its film studio, PolyGram 
Filmed Entertainment (PFE), was sold to Seagram, the parent company of Universal. 
7KLV DUWLFOH H[DPLQHV :RUNLQJ 7LWOH¶V LQWHJUDWLRQ LQWR 8QLYHUVDO DQG WKH HYROYLQJ
media ecology which shaped the processes of development, green-lighting, production, 
marketing and distribution at play within and between both companies between 1998 
DQG,QWKHVHUHVSHFWV:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VWUDQVLWLRQEHWZHHQSDUHQWFRPSDQLHVLVD
narrative of both continuity and change. Significantly, three key stages of gatekeeping 
remained common to both the PFE and Universal eras: development, green-lighting 
and distribution. The institutional perimeters within which these points of decision-
making occurred, however, changed considerably. The article concludes by considering 
the impact of such structures and processes on the films which Working Title produced, 
SDUWLFXODUO\WKHLUYDULRXVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRI%ULWDLQDQGµ%ULWLVKQHVV¶ 
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Introduction 
 
During the 1990s Working Title Films became the most successful production company based 
in Britain, responsible for a string of critically and commercially successful films including 
Four Weddings and a Funeral (1994), Bean (1997), Elizabeth (1998) and Notting Hill (1999). 
7KLV VXFFHVV ZDV VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH FRPSDQ\¶V VWDWXV DV D VXEVLGLDU\ RI 3RO\*UDP )LOPHG
Entertainment (PFE), a nascent film studio which was, in turn, a subsidiary of the major record 
company, PolyGram. The business relationship between the two would, however, come to an 
abrupt end in December 1998 when PolyGram, and with it PFE, was acquired by Seagram, the 
parent company of Universal. Over the course of the following year PolyGram and certain PFE 
assets, including Working Title, were integrated into the Hollywood studio. In the aftermath of 
this transition, the company achieved an unprecedented level of commercial success and 
diversity of output which included medium-budget hits such as Bridget Jones¶s Diary (2001) 
and Love Actually (2003) µVSHFLDOW\¶ SUHVWLJH GUDPDV OLNH Pride & Prejudice (2005) and 
Atonement (2007) and a series of low-budget films including Billy Elliot (2000) and Shaun of 
the Dead (2004).  
The relationship between the film industries and cultures of Britain and Hollywood has 
been a subject of perennial interest to British cinema scholars, resulting in significant 
monographs (Glancy1999; Ryall 2001; Street 2002) which explore, among other things, 
patterns of economic negotiation, issues of textual hybridity and cross-cultural reception. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the scholarship to date about Working Title has also focused on the 
transnational and, more particularly, transatlantic dimensions of the company. Michael Wayne 
 IRU H[DPSOH SRVLWLRQV :RUNLQJ 7LWOH¶V ILOPV ZLWKLQ ZKDW KH FDOOV WKH µ$WODQWLFLVW
SDUDGLJP IRU %ULWLVK FLQHPD¶ DQG DUJXHV WKDW WKH FRPSDQ\ KDV EHHQ LQWHJUDWHG LQWR WKH
Hollywood film industry and operates in a subordinate position whereby the films it produces 
PXVWWDNHDµFXOWXUDOGHWRXU¶WKURXJKWKH American market before arriving in the British market. 
Elsewhere, Johanne Brunet and Galina Gornostaeva (2006) compare the historical structures 
RIWKH%ULWLVKDQG+ROO\ZRRGILOP LQGXVWULHVEHIRUHH[DPLQLQJ:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VUHODWLRQVKLS
with Universal. Taking a somewhat different approach, Tobias Hochscherf and James Leggott 
DFNQRZOHGJHWKHµSRWSRXUULRI%ULWLVKDQG$PHULFDQFKDUDFWHULVWLFV¶RQGLVSOD\ LQ
PDQ\ RI :RUNLQJ 7LWOH¶V ILOPV ZKLOH DOVR DUJXLQJ IRU WKH FRPSDQ\¶V SODFH ZLWKLQ WKH ILOP
industries and cultures of Europe. 
,Q WXUQ :RUNLQJ 7LWOH¶V URPDQWLF FRPHGLHV SDUWLFXODUO\ WKRVH ZULWWHQ E\ 5LFKDUG
Curtis, have attracted considerable academic interest from varying perspectives. Robert 
0XUSK\IRUH[DPSOHGHVFULEHVWKHPDVµXUEDQIDiry-WDOHV¶LQZKLFK/RQGRQEHFRPHV
DQHQFKDQWHGµFLW\RIGHOLJKWV¶3DXO'DYHH[WHQGVWKHIDLU\WDOHFRQFHSWE\H[DPLQLQJ
the representation of social class. Among other things, he notes the construction of a 
PLGGOHFODVVµPHWURSROLWDQLG\OO¶ZKLFKLs exclusive and privileged yet omits visible enclosure 
RUFRQWHVWDWLRQ(OVHZKHUH:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VURPDQWLFFRPHGLHVDUHFRQVLGHUHGLQWKHFRQWH[W
of British traditions of comedy (Mather 2006; Leggott 2012), or in relation to globalisation 
(Kerry 2011). In contrast, Annabelle Honess Roe (2009) focuses her analysis on the 
UHODWLRQVKLSVEHWZHHQ%ULWLVKDQG$PHULFDQFKDUDFWHUVLQ:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VURPDQWLFFRPHGLHV
VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW WKH\SOD\RXW WKH µVSHFLDO UHODWLRQVKLS¶ EHWZHHQ WKH WZRQDWLRQV E\DFWLYHO\
contrasting many of the stereotypical cultural tropes associated with each. Much less, however, 
has been written about Working Title as a functioning production company and the creative 
and business processes and structures which link it to Universal. This article addresses that 
GHILFLWE\H[DPLQLQJ:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VLQWHJUDWLRQLQWRWKH+ROO\ZRRGVWXGLRDQGWKHHYROYLQJ
media ecology that shaped the processes of development, green-lighting, production, 
marketing and distribution at play within and between both companies. In these respects, 
:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶V WUDQVLWLRQ between PFE and Universal is a narrative of both continuity and 
change. Significantly, three key stages of gatekeeping remained common to both the PFE and 
Universal eras: development, green-lighting and distribution. The institutional boundaries 
within which these key points of decision-making occurred, however, shifted considerably. 
Thus the approach taken here will examine development, green-lighting and distribution as 
discrete steps of gatekeeping within a dynamic and evolving studio system. 
 
The demise of PolyGram Filmed Entertainment and the integration of 
Working Title Films into Universal 
 
In May 1998 it was announced in the trade press that PolyGram had been acquired by Seagram 
for $10.6 billion. The enormous SULFHWDJSULPDULO\UHSUHVHQWHGWKHYDOXHRI3RO\*UDP¶s music 
assets, the company having grown to become the largest of the major record companies over 
the course of the 1990s. While steps to integrate PolyGram into Universal Music Group were 
undertaken almost immediately, the fate of PolyGram Filmed Entertainment was not so clear-
cut (Peers 1998: 1). By the time Seagram acquired PolyGram in December 1998 for the revised 
figure of $10.4 billion, several unsuccessful attempts had been made to sell PFE as a going 
concern (Carver and Petrikin 1998: 1). Over the course of the following year, the majority of 
3)(¶V SURGXFWion, marketing and distribution assets would be broken up and sold to third 
parties or closed down. The most notable exceptions were PolyGram Filmed Entertainment 
International (PFEI) ± 3)(¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOQHWZRUNRIPDUNHWLQJDQG distribution companies ± 
and Working Title Films. 
6HDJUDP¶V&KDLUPDQDQG&EO, Edgar Bronfman Jr, was keen to ensure that Working 
Title continue as part of Universal ± unlike PRVWRI 3)(¶V SURGXFWLRQ DVVHWV ,Q SDUWLFXODU
:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶s success in the expanding international market, combined with the FRPSDQ\¶V
economy in production, proved to be considerable draws. The particular contractual 
circumstances VXUURXQGLQJ :RUNLQJ7LWOH¶s integration into the studio also ensured that the 
SURGXFWLRQFRPSDQ\¶s co-FKDLUPHQ7LP%HYDQDQG(ULF)HOOQHUZHUHLQDVHOOHU¶s market. As 
Fellner explains: 
 
We were very fortunate because our service contracts had expired and so Tim and I 
were free agents. Working Title had no value outside Tim and I running it, so we were 
lucky and able to steer the company to where we wanted it to go, regardless of its asset 
value, whatever that was perceived to be. Wherever we went, the Working Title name 
and brand would have gone. We did a separate negotiation with Universal, it just so 
happened that it was the same place as where the PolyGram assets had ended up ... 
There were a lot of reasons to do it at Universal but primarily it was the relationship 
with staff there and the promise that Edgar Bronfman, who owned Seagram and the 
studio then made us, which was he wanted to set up a company that was additional to 
the slate, to the core slate, and that additionality meant that he was making films that 
WKHVWXGLRZRXOGQ¶t QRUPDOO\KDYHPDGHDQGWKDW¶VZKDWKH wanted us to do. Everyone 
else ZRXOGKDYHWULHGWRVXEVXPHXVLQWRWKHPDLQVODWHDQGZH¶d never have got any 
films made.1 
 
7KHILOPVWKDWD+ROO\ZRRGVWXGLRµZRXOGQ¶WQRUPDOO\KDYHPDGH¶ZHUHexemplified 
by much of Working Title¶VEDFNFDWDORJXHSDUWLFXODUO\the unlikely low- to medium-budget 
British hit films for which the FRPSDQ\KDGEHFRPHEHVWNQRZQ,QWKLVZD\:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶V
years as a subsidiary of PFE had acted as a proving ground for what British films in popular 
genres could achieve at the worldwide box office. In turn, an integral element of that success 
ZDV DOVR DWWULEXWHG WR 3)(¶V development of the so-FDOOHG µFRQWURO VKHHW¶, a creative and 
commercial filter used to assess the risk and reward profile of film projects. As I have described 
elsewhere (2017), the control sheet was a document that presented revenue and expenditure 
forecasts prRGXFHGE\3)(¶Vmarketing and distribution divisions for films in development at 
3)(¶s production companies. The control sheet then became a key tool in informing green-
lighting decisions which were collectively made E\ 3)(¶V VHQLRU PDQDJHPHQW SURGXFWLRQ
companies and marketing and distribution divisions. During the months of contract 
negotiations between Working Title and Universal, Angela Morrison, Working Title COO, 
took a leading role alongside Bevan and Fellner. Considering WKH FRPSDQ\¶V SULRULWLHV LQ
brokering a deal with the studio, she elaborates: 
 
We wanted to maintain the degree of autonomy that we had managed to get to with 
3RO\*UDP:H¶GOHDUQHGWKHOHVVRQVZH¶GEHHQWKURXJKWKH rigours of the control sheet 
and green-lighting and we thought that we were at the point in our collective company 
career that we could make some of our own decisions without having to get approval 
from LA. We were successful in negotiating a lot of things along those lines to do with 
what we spent on our overhead, how we managed the business, the staffing, then how 
we managed production, how much we could spend on productions without a full 
green-light decision being made with the studio.2 
 
In March 1999 Bevan and Fellner committed to a five-year deal which would see 
Working Title continue life as a subsidiary of Universal. Within the terms of the new 
agreement, the producers were permitted to green-light up to five films a year with individual 
production budgets of up to $25 million without approval from Universal. Films with budgets 
over $25 million would be considered on a case-by-case basis with the sWXGLR¶VLQYROYHPHQW
(Dawtrey 1999: 1). In May, Universal and Canal Plus agreed to co-finance the operational, 
development 
and production costs of Working Title on a 50:50 basis. In return for their contribution, Canal 
Plus received television rights to all :RUNLQJ7LWOH¶V ILOPV LQFRQWLQHQWal Europe (excluding 
the UK and Ireland) and French theatrical and video rights for every second film for the first 
three years of the deal. In the fourth and final year of the agreement, Canal Plus would receive 
theatrical and video rights in all territories in continental Europe (Dawtrey 1999b: 8), a clause 
which foreshadowed the compDQ\¶VH[SDQVLRQLQWRWKHDWULFDOdistribution and the rebranding 
of its production and distribution arm as StudioCanal the following year (James 2000: 1). 
The combination of financial backing and creative autonomy which Working Title had 
achieved made the company an unrivalled force not only within the British film industry, but 
also within Europe. Simultaneously, Working Title became just one of 35 production 
companies that were under contract to Universal in 1999 (Carver 1999: 84). Unlike the majority 
of these production companies, however, Working Title is a directly owned subsidiary as 
opposed to an independent. This status was reflected in the business relationship between the 
WZRZKLFKZDVH[FOXVLYHUDWKHUWKDQWKHPRUHXVXDOµfirst ORRN¶GHDO:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VVSHFLDO
status of being at once within and without the studio perfectly mirrored WKH FRPSDQ\¶V
relationship with the British film industry. While its head office was on Oxford Street in 
London, Working Title also had an office on Wilshire Boulevard in BeverlyHills and remained 
a component part of a multinational media conglomerate headquartered in Los Angeles. 
 
Gate I: Development 
 
:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VVWDWXVDVDVXEVLGLDU\RI8QLYHUVDODQGWhe exclusive contractual commitment 
of its key personnel to the studio ensured that the company operated as an internal business 
within a studio system. Thus the company was provided with annual overhead, development 
and production budgets by Universal and StudioCanal in order to complete its two essential 
functions: the development and production of feature films. A crucial aspect of this 
arrangement was creative autonomy at the point of development, a freedom that the company 
had also attained under PFE. While Bevan and Fellner jointly decided which film projects to 
develop, the slate was subsequently divided between the two producers, with each managing 
the development and production of individual projects separately thereafter. The role of the 
producer, and by extension the production company, is perhaps best characterised as the 
intermediary between creativity and commerce. As Fellner explains: 
 
A producer is like the chief executive of any business. He has to build the business, 
come up with the ideas, come up with the money to support those ideas and find the 
creative and technical talent to make those ideas into reality. He has to finance the 
business going forward, run the business to a schedule and a budget, and ensure that 
every single person employed is doing absolutely everything that he or she ought to be 
doing and support them, in all the ways that you can support them, so they can do their 
EHVWZRUN7KHQZKHQWKH\¶Ye made their product, he ensures that that product is as 
good as it possibly can be and that it gets to market, WKDW LW¶VSURSHUO\PDUNHWHGDQG
distributed.3 
 
 
The four integrated film-making departments which the company had established at the 
start of the PFE era ± development, production, US office and legal and business affairs ± 
remained in place, as did the majority of key personnel. Debra Hayward continued in post as 
head of development in London, while Liza Chasin remained her opposite number in Los 
Angeles. Similarly, Angela Morrison continued to manage the legal and business affairs 
department, which not only serviced development and production internally, but also mediated 
:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VUHODWLRQVKLS with Universal and StudioCanal at a strategic level. Jane Frazer, 
however, stepped down as head of production to be replaced by Michelle Wright. A broad 
sense of continuity was felt in most areas of WorkinJ7LWOH¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKLWVnew parent 
company, albeit one of increased scale. As Hayward notes: 
 
When you are lucky enough to see a film from its conception all the way through to its 
execution, everybody learns that way, everybody that is involved learns. If you are able 
to do that over and over again, which is what we were doing at Working Title, then you 
hone your skills DQGEHFRPHEHWWHUDQGEHWWHU,W¶OOalways just keep coming back to 
material for me, which is, all of a suddHQWKHUH¶VUHVRXUFHVWRGHYHORSmore material. 
In developing more material . . . you have a number of films hanging over these possible 
VORWVDQG\RX¶YHJRWSURGXFWLRQfinancing which is allowing you to maNHDILOP<RX¶UH
in a cycle of PDNLQJILOPVDQGZKHQ\RX¶UHSRVWLQJRQH\RX¶UHSUHSSLQJDQRWKHU<RX
FDQNHHS WKH PDFKLQH UROOLQJDORQJZKHQ \RX¶UH FDSLWDOLVHG OLNe that, as opposed to 
raising the money to make a film and then starting that whole process again.4 
 
7KHGLVWULEXWLRQRI:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶s influence and resources among the wider British 
film industry could also be measured by its cyclical contractual ties with both other production 
companies and individuals beyond its development departments. In maintaining external 
development deals with, among others, Richard Curtis, Joe Wright, Stephen Daldry and Edgar 
Wright, Working Title had begun to act like a miniature British-based studio. Indeed, it 
extended the same level of developmental autonomy to the independent companies on its books 
that it had been granted by Universal. While WKH PDMRULW\RI :RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VGHYHORSPHQW
production, legal and business infrastructure was based in /RQGRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶V/$RIILFH
continued to prove vital in bridging the gap between the UK and Hollywood industries. As 
Chasin explains: 
 
I view my role as the front man to the business on this end . . . I have very close twenty 
plus year relationships with the industry on this end, so I do a lot of the interfacing with 
the studio, with Universal, and a lot of the day-to-day with the community at large, 
whether it be directly with the talent that lives here or with the agents, lawyers, 
managers etcetera who represent the talent . . . We run, I would say, not really half the 
slate, but half the active projects out of the LA office with a view to making probably 
one to two films a year on this end, versus the numbers on that end. So, theUH¶VDORWRI
managing the actXDOVODWHZHFDQ¶WPDNHDfilm over there without it taking up a lot 
of VSDFHRYHUKHUHLW¶VMXVWWKHQDWXUHRIWKHZD\LWZRUNV,W¶VUHDOO\OLDLVLQJZLWKWKH
town and pushing these things forward and, of course, getting the new material and 
getting people to want to come work here.5 
 
7KH LQWHJUDWLRQ DOVR SURPSWHG WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI :RUNLQJ 7LWOH¶V own subsidiary 
production company, WT2, in May 1999 which was given the remit of producing films with 
budgets of $5 million or less (Dawtrey 1999c: 12). Under the leadership of Natascha Wharton, 
the new company operated as a separate development and production unit with its own staff 
and budgets but remained in WorkiQJ7LWOH¶V/RQGRQoffice and continued to report to Bevan 
and Fellner. Considering the QHZFRPSDQ\¶VSRVLWLRQDQGUHPLW:KDUWRQHODERUDWHV 
 
,W¶VTXLWHUDUHWREHPDNLQJDILOPDWDPLOOLRQOHYHODQGDVVXPHWKDWLW will then play 
internationally. Bizarrely sometimes they do, and the ones WKDW\RXGRQ¶WH[Sect do . . . 
It was quite a challenge because we were looking at really interesting film-makers and 
we always did have an eye RQDXGLHQFHDVZHOO$JDLQZKHQ\RX¶UHPDNing films at 
that sort of level that is quite a challenge. If you look at most of the British films that 
are made with emerging talent at the moPHQWWKH\¶UHPXFKPRUHRYHUWO\festival driven 
films, whereas our agenda was to try to find that talent, and to try and make those films, 
but for those films to have a similar sort of mainstream appeal as the other Working 
Title films.6 
 
The production department maintained its reputation as lavish by the standards of the 
independent British film industry, but highly cost effective by the standards of Hollywood. 
Since the advent of section 42 of the Finance (No. 2) Act 1992 and section 48 of the Finance 
(No. 2) Act 1997 tax relief, Working Title had, like many other UK-based production 
companies, benefitted from the fertile economic climate which the legislation promoted. In 
1992, for example, 30 films were produced in the UK at a combined cost of £98.48 million. In 
the final year of the same decade 92 films had been produced for £506.68 million, and by 2006 
134 films were produced for £845.33 million (UKFC 2009: 121±3). As Wright explains, her 
job was to interrogate all of the production planning from a logistical and economic perspective 
in collaboration with the principal film-makers: 
 
If a movie is worth so much money to the financiers and the producers and the 
distributors, then how do we make that ZRUN"7KDW¶VWKHchallenge of it and the fun of 
it . . . Once we have a script that everybody likes, that may be in re-writes, but we know 
pretty much the structure of what the script is going to be, and we have film-makers 
attached, we have a package. We go in and we break it down. We take the script and 
we try to turn it into a fine science by breaking it down into a schedule and a budget. 
,W¶VDPDQDJHPHQWWRROWRGRVRWKDW¶VWKHRQO\ZD\WRPDQDJHVRPHWKLQJWKDW¶VFUHDWLYH
like that. We break it down into a schedule: how many days can you shoot it? How do 
you shoot it? Where do you shoot it? How much will it cost? Once we have that 
package, we get to work on ILJXULQJRXWWKDWQRUPDOO\LW¶VWRRPXch and we figure out 
how we can make it less.7 
 
A film in development at Working Title would, however, only go into production when 
a green-light decision was made. According to UHSRUWV LQ WKH WUDGH SUHVV :RUNLQJ 7LWOH¶V
relationship with Universal was based upon a high degree of creative and financial autonomy. 
Where Working Title had been subject to the rigours of the control sheet under PFE, the 
company now appeared to have free rein to develop and produce any film with a budget under 
$25 million. 
 
Gate II: Green-lighting 
 
The most closely guarded decision in the film-making process is the decision to green-light a 
project in development and thus set in motion WKHSURGXFWLRQRIDIHDWXUHILOPµ2XUrelationship 
for green-lighting was channelled through Universal. They were the ultimate decision maker 
on the big-EXGJHWPRYLHV¶ 0RUULVRQH[SODLQVµ*RLQJEDFNto the lower budget movies, even 
where we had what we called the ³SXWV¶¶ZHGLGQ¶WH[HUFLVHWKHP:Hwould go through the 
greenlight process and make sure everybody was haSS\ZLWKWKDW¶7KHµSXWV¶VKHelaborated, 
was a situation in which Working Title had the contractual autonomy to green-light a film up 
to a certain budget level and were so-FDOOHGEHFDXVHµZHFRXOG³SXWWKHPWRWKHVWXGLR¶¶ZH
could force them to green-OLJKWWKHP¶8 Thus WorkLQJ7LWOH¶VWUDQVLWLRQIURP3)(to Universal 
did not alter the fundamental premise of the parent-subsidiary company dynamic which relied 
on consensus building and collective decision making, as Fellner confirms: 
 7KHERWWRP OLQH LV WKDW LWGLGQ¶W PHDQDQDwful lot in terms of day-today operation, 
because you can green-OLJKW D ILOP EXW \RX GRQ¶W ZDQW to green-light it unless the 
distributor wants to distribute it, because otherwise you greenlight a film that gets 
dumped and there is nothing more depressing than that. If you understand the power of 
distribution and marketing, you understand that equation, and we understood that. We 
GLGQ¶WMXVWLPPHGLDWHO\JRµZH¶UHPDNLQJWKLVZH¶UHPDNLQJWKDWZH¶UHmaking the 
RWKHU¶:HGHYHORSHGDrelationship with the studio to try to make sure that everything 
we wanted to make, they wanted, and that UIP would distribute it properly and that it 
would get a real life in the marketplace.9 
 
In the first instance, the green-lighting process involved a discussion between Working 
Title and Universal DERXWWKHIRUPHU¶VGHYHORSPHQWslate and the projects that were being put 
forward for green-lighting. Beneath Universal Pictures Chair, Stacey Snider, the key players at 
Universal included Co-Presidents of Production Mary Parent and Scott Stuber, and a host of 
Vice PresidentVZKRRYHUVDZ8QLYHUVDO¶VVODWHat large and managed its relationships with its 
contracted production companies and individuals. In practice, the green-lighting process within 
Universal acted as an extension and reiteration of the processes undertaken by Working Title 
during development. The discussions leading to a green-light decision considered the entire 
package of the film ± script, cast, crew, budget ± were discussed in a collective and iterative 
fashion. All such decisions were, however, also directed through a creative and commercial 
filtHUZKLFK UHVHPEOHG WKH µFRQWURO VKHHW¶ WKDW3)(KDGXVHG WKURXJKRXWWKHV ,QGHHG
control sheet-like practices had also been adopted by the Hollywood studios at large. For 
Working Title, this process was initially undertaken within 8QLYHUVDO¶V%XVLQHVV'HYHORSPHQW
and Strategic Planning Group in Los Angeles. Gareth Wilson, who began working within the 
group in 2003, was responsible for generating revenue forecasts for all of the films in 
development at the various production companies under contact to Universal. As he explains: 
 
When it was a young project at UnivHUVDO ZH¶G UXQ D VHW RI QXPEHUV that were 
effectively driven by a model that has been built up over time. The model aggregates 
historical film performances and uses that data to forecast future performance at various 
box office levels. That helps formulate the initial view as to the ILOP¶VSURILWDELOLW\DQG
helps inform decisions about participations, [as] key creative players often get paid 
based on film performance. As the project takes shape over time, WKDW¶VZKHQ\RXVWDUW
going to all the different distribution departments VD\LQJµZKDWGR\RXWKLQNWKLVILOP
will dR"¶VR\RXKDYHILJXUHVIRUER[office, home video in all its various forms, and 
TV with corresponding marketing and distribution costs. By the time you get a green-
lit film you KDYHDV3RO\*UDPZRXOGFDOOLWDµFRQWURO VKHHW¶RUZKDW8QLYHUVDOFDOOVa 
µWHQFROXPQ¶7KHWHQFROXPQ LV WHQVFHQDULos from a low-performance scenario to a 
high-performance scenario and one of those scenarios will be a green-light case where 
you have a set of numbers that everyone thinks they can deliver on. That case will build 
in a return on investment based on various metrics, which differed depending on the 
owner.10 
 
As well as generating revenue forecasts which indicated the anticipated profitability of 
each film project under consideration for greenlighting, WKH µWHQ FROXPQ¶ DOVR Lnitiated the 
planning stages of the marketing and distribution campaigns which would be further developed 
in cases where a green-light decision was reached. The VWXGLR¶VUHWXUQRQLQYHVWPHQWRYHUWKH
cRXUVHRIDILOP¶VILUVWSURGXFWlifecycle was simultaneously examined, as Wilson elaborates: 
 
)RUDQDFFRXQWLQJSHUVSHFWLYH \RX¶OO KDYH \RXUSURGXFWLRQFRVWV amortised over the 
lifecycle of eight years, which is how long studios are required to forecast what their 
films ZLOOPDNH$QGVRWKDW¶VZKDWUHDOO\ZH¶UHORRNLQJDWZKHQZH¶UHORRNLng at a 
FRQWUROVKHHWRU\RX¶UHORRNLQJDWDWHQFROXPQ<RX¶UHHVWLPDWLQJDSSroximately, the 
ILUVW OLIHF\FOH« Roll forward as the revenue drips in over the course of eight years, 
obviously most of it in the first two years as your theatrical, video and TV revenues 
come in and then at the end of the day make sure that RQDQDQQXDOLVHGEDVLV\RX¶YH
made a seven per cent return. That was the threshold. Seven to ten seems to be the going 
rate around the industry.11 
 
 
In 2006, Wilson moved from UniversDO¶V /$ KHDGTXDUWHUV WR :RUNLQJ 7LWOH¶V KHDG
office in London to begin producing ten columns H[FOXVLYHO\IRU:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VGHYHlopment 
VODWHµ,WZDVDQRWLRQof just wanting the capability to look a little bit more closely and have 
the flexibility to run your own models as opposed to relying on Universal where you might not 
be getting the full information, just simply because there is a bit of negotiatioQWKHUH¶:LOVRQ
H[SODLQVµ)RUXVWRJHWILOPVPDGHLI8QLYHUVDO¶VJRLQg to make them, we have to sell them 
RQWKHILOP(YHQWKRXJKZH¶UHSartners with them in many ways, WKH\¶UHVWLOODFURVVWKHWDEOH
LQVRPHRWKHUV¶12  
:RUNLQJ 7LWOH¶V SURGXFWLRQ DFWLYLWLHV were, of course, also dependent on the wider 
production strategy of Universal. Speaking in 2005, 6QLGHUGHVFULEHGWKHµSRUWIROLR¶VWUDtegy 
which she had implemented since her elevation to Chair of Universal Pictures in 1999. The 
strategy involved producing fourteen to sixteen films a year with a range of budgets and genres, 
often with the potential for sequels. This included one or two big-EXGJHWµWHQWSROH¶ILOPVVXFK
as Jurassic Park III (2001) and King Kong (2005), four or five medium-EXGJHWµHYHQW¶ILOPV
such as Meet the Parents (2000) and The Bourne Identity (2002) and seven or eight low-budget 
µSRUWIROLR¶ ILOPV LQFOXGLQJAmerican Pie (1999) and Bring It On (2000). Between 1999 and 
2006 Working Title produced 34 films for Universal which were released at a rate of between 
three and seven a year. All of these films fell within or between the medium budget µHYHQW¶DQG
low-EXGJHWµSRUWIROLR¶FDWHJRULHVDQGGLVSOD\HGWKHdiversity of genre required by the wider 
Universal strategy.  
:KLOHWKHµHYHQW¶DQGµSRUWIROLR¶FDtegories are imprecise, Working 7LWOH¶VVODWHLQWKLV
period can be broadly divided into two subsets of film which broadly conform to either the 
portfolio or event labels. 7DEOHVKRZV:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VPDLQVODWHE\JHQUHZKLFKFRPSULVHV 
ODUJHO\ µHYHQW¶ ILOPV EXW DOVR VRPH µSRUWIROLR¶ ILOPV ,Q FRQWUDVW 7DEOH  shows the films 
produced by WT2 by genre which exclusively fall into WKH µSRUWIROLR¶FDWHJRU\ ,W LVZRUWK
noting that the average cost of a ILOPLQ:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VPDLQVODWHbetween 1999 and 2006 
was $34.1 million13, a figure considerably below the Hollywood average which stood at $51.5 
million in 1999 and increased to $65.8 million by 2006 (MPAA 2003, 2007). The considerably 
lower cost of WT2 films would, of course, lower the average substantially if the slates of both 
companies were considered as a whole. 
Examining Working 7LWOH¶VRXWSXWEHWZHHQDQGRI course, highlights the 
films which were green-lit by Universal. All of these were official UK productions or co-
productions, which typically also reflected the national economic inputs of both Universal (US) 
and StudioCanal (France). Within this slate, eighteen out of FDQEHFODVVHGDVµFXOWXUDOO\
BrLWLVK¶ LQVRIDU DV WKH\ IHDWXUHG predominantly British characters, settings and narrative 
themes. Significantly, however, in reaching a green-light decision both Working Title and 
Universal viewed each film project through the ten column and thus through the prism of 
worldwide commercial appeal. Considering the consequences of being a British production 
company which produces culturally British films within the contemporary Hollywood studio 
system, Bevan explains: 
 
One of the issues with being a British producer is that, unlike being a French producer 
or an Italian producer or a German producer, you share your native language with the 
biggest producer of motion pictures in the world. That brings a set of advantages and a 
set of disadvantages. The set of advantages it brings is that you will probably get your 
films distributed around the world easier than your French, Italian or German 
 
 
Table 1 ±Working Title main slate by genre, 1999-2006 (all figures in $USD million) 
Title /Genre Year Origin 
Culturally 
British? 
Prod. 
Budget 
Domestic 
BO (%) 
International  
BO (%) 
UK  
BO (%) 
Worldwide 
BO  
Comedy (Romantic) 
      
Notting Hill 1999 UK/US Yes 42 116 (31.9) 247.8 (68.1) 49.2 (13.5) 363.8 
Bridget Jones's Diary 2001 UK/US/FR Yes 25 71.5 (25.4) 210.3 (74.6) 60.2 (21.4) 281.8 
40 Days and 40 Nights 2002 UK/US/FR No  - 37.9 (39.9) 57.1 (60.1) 7.7 (8.1) 95.0 
The Guru 2002 UK/US/FR No  - 3.0 (12.5) 21.0 (87.5) 10.1 (42.1) 24.0 
Love Actually 2003 UK/US/FR Yes 40 59.6 (24.1) 187.2 (75.9) 62.6 (25.4) 246.8 
Wimbledon 2004 UK/US/FR Yes 31 17. 0 (41.0) 24.5 (59.0) 12.9 (31.1) 41.5 
Bridget Jones: The Edge of 
Reason 2004 
UK/US/FR/ 
GER/IRE Yes 40 40.2 (15.3) 222.2 (84.7) 68.2 (26.0) 262.4 
Comedy / Comedy Drama 
      
High Fidelity 2000 UK/US No 30 27.2 (57.9) 19.8 (42.1) - 47.0 
O Brother, Where Art 
Thou? 2000 UK/US/FR No  - 45.5 (63.4) 26.3 (36.6) - 71.8 
About a Boy 2002 
UK/US/FR/ 
GER Yes 30 41.3 (31.7) 89.1 (68.3) 24.3 (18.6) 130.4 
Johnny English 2003 UK/US/FR Yes 40 28.0 (17.4) 132.5 (82.6) 31.1 (19.4) 160.5 
Drama 
        
The Man Who Cried 1999 UK/FR No  - 0.7 (100) - - 0.7 
Captain Corelli's Mandolin 2001 Uk/US/FR No 57 25.5 (41.1) 36.5 (58.9) 12.9 (20.8) 62.0 
The Man Who Wasn't 
There 2001 UK/US No 20 7.5 (37.9) 11.4 (60.3) 2.3 (12.2) 18.9 
The Shape of Things 2003 UK/US/FR No 4 0.7 (100) - - 0.7 
Ned Kelly 2003 
UK/US/AUS/ 
FR No  - 0.1 (1.2) 6.4 (98.8) 0.8 (12.3) 6.5 
Pride & Prejudice 2005 UK/US/FR Yes 28 38.4 (31.7) 82.7 (68.3) 26.5 (21.9) 121.1 
Family 
        
Thunderbirds 2004 UK/FR Yes 57 6.8 (24.1) 21.4 (75.9) 10.1 (35.8) 28.2 
Nanny McPhee 2005 UK/US/FR Yes 25 47.1 (38.5) 75.3 (61.5) 29.1 (23.8) 122.4 
Thriller/Action 
       
Plunkett and Macleane 1999 UK Yes  - 0.4 (100) - - 0.4 
The Interpreter 2005 
UK/US/FR/ 
GER No 80 72.7 (44.6) 90.2 (55.4) 13.7 (8.4) 162.9 
Smokin' Aces 2006 UK/US No 17 35.7 (62.6) 21.3 (37.4) 6.2 (10.9) 57.0 
United 93 2006 UK/US/FR No 15 31.4 (41.2) 44.8 (58.8) 5.3 (7.0) 76.2 
Catch a Fire 2006 
UK/US/FR/ 
SA No  - 4.2 (75.0) 1.4 (25.0) 0.1 (1.8) 5.6 
TOTAL         
758.38 
(31.8) 1629.2 (68.2) 
433.3 
(18.1) 2387.6 
Sources: Boxofficemojo.com (box office data) imdb.com (origin and production budgets) 
 
 
 
Table 2 ±WT2 slate by genre 1999-2006 (all figures in $USD million) 
Title /Genre Year Origin 
Culturally 
British? 
Prod. 
Budget 
Domestic 
BO (%) 
International 
BO (%) 
UK  
BO (%) 
Worldwide 
BO  
Comedy / Comedy Drama 
      
Ali G Indahouse 2002 
UK/US/FR/ 
GER Yes 5  - 23.2 (100) 14.8 (63.8) 23.2 
Shaun of the Dead 2004 UK/US/FR Yes 4 13.5 (45.2) 16.4 (54.8) 12.3 (41.1) 29.9 
The Calcium Kid 2004 UK Yes  -  - 0.1 (100) 0.1 (100) 0.1 
Mickeybo and Me 2004 UK Yes 5  - 0.4 (100) 0.4 (100) 0.4 
Inside I'm Dancing 2004 UK/FR/IRE No  - 0.02 (1.6) 1.2 (98.4) 1.2 (98.4) 1.2 
Sixty Six 2006 UK/FR Yes  - 0.2 (11.1) 1.6 (88.9) 1.5 (83.3) 1.8 
Drama 
        
Billy Elliot 2000 UK/FR Yes 5 21.9 (20.1) 87.2 (79.9) 25.2 (23.1) 109.1 
Horror 
        
Longtime Dead 2002 UK/FR Yes  - - 13.1 (100) 2.5 (19.1) 13.1 
My Little Eye  2002 
UK/US/FR/ 
CAN No 2 - 6.8 (100) 4.0 (58.8) 6.8 
Gone 2006 UK/AUS No  - - - - 0.0 
TOTAL         35.62 (19.2) 150 (80.8) 62 (33.4) 185.6 
Sources: Boxofficemojo.com (box office data) imdb.com (origin and production budgets). 
 
 
HTXLYDOHQW 7KH GLVDGYDQWDJH LV WKDW \RX¶UH JRLQJ WR EH FRPSDUHG WR Hollywood. If 
\RX¶UHPDNLQJPRYLHVIRUD living, the frustration quickly becomes not about getting 
your film made, but about getting your film seen by as many people as you possibly 
can. It seemed obvious to me when I was making independent films that the things 
audiences liked were production values, famous actors and genre ± stories that they 
could relate to. Eric and I decided to apply that to the sorts of films that we made.14 
 
By combining the dominant aesthetic and cultural forms of Hollywood film-making ± 
production values, star actors and genre ± with British characters, settings and cultural themes, 
Working Title reasserted its reputation as the pre-eminent producer of globally oriented British 
cinema. Within this broad creative framework, however, there was considerable room for 
GLYHUVLW\ UDQJLQJ IURP WKH µHYHQW¶ ILOPV of the main slate which typically included higher 
production values and established Hollywood film stars to the µSRUWIROLR¶ILOPVRI:7which 
produced films with lower production values and stars primarily established in the UK. This 
diversity was, however, substantially reduced when WT2 was folded into Working Title in 
2005, continuing DVDµODEHO¶LQto 2006 before being disbanded (Hoffman 2006: 2). 
 
 
Gate III: Distribution 
 
The position that Working Title had negotiated with Universal was replicated in its relationship 
with the studLR¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO GLVWULEXWLRQ company, United International Pictures (UIP). 
Originally operated as a joint venture between MGM, Paramount and Universal, UIP was 
KHDGTXDUWHUHG LQ /RQGRQ EXW RSHUDWHG GLUHFWO\ LQ  µLQWHUQDWLRQDO¶ markets outside the 
µGRPHVWLF¶Parket of the US and Canada, and subcontracted third-party distributors in dozens 
of other territories. Despite MGM leaving the UIP partnership in 2001, the company continued 
to distribute 35 to 40 films a year, including films produced by Dreamworks, which had a 
distribution agreement with Universal.  
At the point of 3)(¶V LQWHJUDWLRQ8niversal had planned to replace UIP with PFEI, 
3)(¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDl network of thirteen marketing and distribution companies, which was 
renamed Universal Pictures International (UPI) in 1999. The plan was, however, soon reversed 
and the venture was largely dismantled. One of the few UPI assets to survive was its London-
based marketing division run by former PFEI executive, David Livingstone, who was 
appointed UPI President of Marketing and Distribution. The unit was initially given the remit 
RIPDUNHWLQJ:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VILOPVDOongside international marketing RI8QLYHUVDO¶VVSHFLDOW\
films and international acquisitions (Dawtrey 2000: 16). The division was later brought in-
house at Working Title ZLWK/LYLQJVWRQHDSSRLQWHGWKHFRPSDQ\¶V3UHsident of Worldwide 
Marketing. Explaining the rationale for transition from Working 7LWOH¶V SHUVSHFWLYH
Livingstone notes: 
 
,WKLQNWKH\¶GJURZQXVHGWREHLQJLQFRQWURORIWKHLURZQGHVWLQ\DQG even though I 
ZDVZRUNLQJIRUDQRWKHUFRPSDQ\,¶GZRUked very, very closely and very well with 
them. I think WKH\VXGGHQO\WKRXJKWµ*RGLIwe suddenly end up going through this big 
faceless company, UIP, we will EHRQHRIILOPVWKH\¶UHUHOHDVLQJHDFK\HDU¶ZKHUHDV
WKH\¶GJRWXVHGto, with me there, being one of ten films . . . [UIP] had so many films 
to release that it was a slightly homogenisHGHQYLURQPHQW,GRQ¶WZDQWWRbe too critical 
of it, but they had so many films and so many bosses and so many territories that it was 
quite hard to get attention. We used to, basically, deliver to them what we wanted and 
try and make it work that way, by basically delivering them a completed package.15 
 
In practice, Livingstone worked closely with Bevan and Fellner to produce briefs that 
were then distributed to third-party creative agencies which designed the marketing materials 
IRU :RUNLQJ 7LWOH¶V films. The results would be subject to further refinement before being 
submitted to Universal for approval and ultimately delivery to UIP. Thereafter Livingstone 
would manage the publicity and promotional campaigns which simultaneously accompanied 
the release of Working 7LWOH¶VILOPV7KHGLVWULEXWLRQDQG marketing budget for any given film 
was, however, initially planned at the green-lighting stage and scaled in relation WRWKHILOP¶V
production budget, an approach which IDYRXUHG:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VPHGLXP-budgeWµHYHQW¶ILOPV
over low-budget µSRUWIROLR¶ILOPV$V8,3¶VIRUPHU Chairman and CEO, Paul Oneile, explains: 
 
It was on a film-by-film basis. If you go back to the green-lighting process, obviously 
Universal was heavily involved in the green-lighting process for Working Title product 
and that would be all part of it. This is how much the film production was going to cost 
and on that basis ± provided the film turns out as we all hope it will ± then we will look 
DWVSHQGLQJµ[¶dollars marketing it around the world aQGµ\¶RQSULQWV2QFHWKHILOP
has been produced you look at it and say µ\HVLWKDVWXUQHGRXWDVZHOODVZH¶GKRSHG¶
« VR ZH¶OO JR DKHDG ZLWK WKH UHOHDVH Vtrategy as we had anticipated it during the 
greenlighting process. It never actually worked that way because it became much more 
coPSOLFDWHGDQG,¶GOLNHWRWKLQNPXFKPRUHEXVLQHVV-like.16 
 
While an assessment of the completed film could prompt a revision of the initial 
distribution and marketing budget upwards or downwards, the release strategy was also 
predicated upon an assessment of the market potential of the film by territory and, ultimately, 
the establishment of market success or failure upon release. AV 8,3¶V former COO and 
President, Andrew Cripps, explains: 
 
We would agree collaboratively with the studio how much we were going to spend. If 
you were unsure about the international prospects of a film \RXZRXOGQ¶WUHOHDVHDOO
your territories day-and-GDWH\RX¶GJRRQDVWDJJHUHGUHOHDVHSODQDQGVD\µKHUHDUH
the three or four markets where the feedback from the territories was the most 
RSWLPLVWLF¶RUµZHWKLQNthat they can do a good job based on these historical SUHFHGHQWV¶
«:H¶UHJRLQJ to try it in those markets first, and then we would, and then if they were 
successful then you roll it out in another sequence of markets. ,I WKH\ ZHUHQ¶W
VXFFHVVIXO\RXZRXOGQ¶Wspend any more in other markets and you could claw back 
your losses. Once it was in release it was up to the territory team to push it as hard as 
they could to make sure they keep it playing on the screen for as long as they can, 
negotiating with exhibition. Typically most of your marketing is spent up front anyway 
with a little bit of sustaining marketing that you would build into the campaign, but 
once LW¶VLQUHOHDVH\RX¶UHWU\LQJWRJHW as much as you can out of it.17 
 
 
Significantly, establishing commercial success in the theatrical market bore a direct 
relation to the prospecWV RI 8QLYHUVDO¶V international sister companies, Universal Pictures 
International Home Video, Universal International Television Distribution and Universal 
1HWZRUNV,QWHUQDWLRQDOµ7KHUHDUe very few examples of a failed theatrical movie that went on 
to be a suFFHVVLQRWKHUZLQGRZV¶&ULSSVH[SODLQVµ,Q\RXUILUVWZLQGRZWRWKHconsumer, you 
have to make sure that is a success or everything else suffers . . . every movie is its own brand, 
DQG\RX¶UHKDYLQJWRHVWDEOLVKWKDWEUDnd every time you go to the PDUNHWSODFH¶18 As Cripps 
goes on to point out, however, once the theatrical release strategy began to unfold UIP was 
ideally placed to negotiate favourable terms with exhibitors: 
 
There were only seven Hollywood studios and UIP represented three of them. So, if 
you were an exhibitor, the one company you probably GLGQ¶WZDQWWRJHWRII-side was 
UIP, or whoever happened to have the best line up of films coming out. But inevitably, 
what made UIP work so incredibly well was that the movie business is a very cyclical 
business. 6R ZKHQ 3DUDPRXQW¶V KDYLQJ D JUHDW \HDU VRPHWLPHV 8QLYHUVDO ZDVQ¶W
having such a good year. UIP could balance that out and they had a pretty strong slate 
of films year-in and year-out even though one of the component parts may not be having 
its beVWILOP\HDUHYHU,I\RX¶UHDQexhibitor you knew, inevitably, 40 per cent of your 
hit movies were going to come from UIP. UIP was very careful, I would stress, not to 
DEXVHLW« but that implied leverage meant that you were probably going to get your 
films played, you were going to get yRXUWUDLOHUVSOD\HGDQG\RX¶UHJRLQJWRJHWSDLG
on time.19 
 
:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VVODWHRIIilms found its audience largely in the international market which 
accounted for $1.62 billion (68.2 per cent) of worldwide gross theatrical revenue as opposed 
to the domestic market which contributed £758.38 million (31.8 per cent). Within the 
consolidated international figure, the UK accounted for a substantial $433.3 million (18.1 per 
cent) of the worldwide gross. :KHQ WKH µFXOWXUDOO\ %ULWLVK¶ ILOPV ZLWKLn the main slate are 
considered alone, however, the international and UK revenue components were proportionally 
yet more pronounced at 73.4 per cent ($1.29 billion) and 21.2 per cent ($374.2 million) 
respectively. Within this subsection, the romantic comedy, comedy and comedy drama were 
Working 7LWOH¶V JUHDWHVW FRPPHUFLDO VXFFHVVHV )RXU URPDQWLF FRPHGLHV ± Notting Hill, 
Bridget Jones¶s Diary, Love Actually and Bridget Jones: The Edge of Reason (2004) ± each 
grossed substantially over $200 million and collectively over $1 billion worldwide. Two other 
comedies, About a Boy (2002) and Johnny English (2003), each grossed over $100 million, and 
further films outside the comedy genre, Nanny McPhee and Pride & Prejudice, achieved the 
same feat. In contrast, Working 7LWOH¶VQRQ-culturally British (and typically American) main 
slate faired comparatively poorly, grossing $628.3 million, of which $292.1 million (46.5 per 
cent) was domestic revenue, $336.2 million (53.5 per cent) was international revenue and $59.1 
million (9.4 per cent) was UK revenue. Significantly, only one film within this category, The 
Interpreter (2005), exceeded $100 million worldwide.  
Unsurprisingly, the overall commercial success of WT2 films was limited when 
FRPSDUHG WR :RUNLQJ 7LWOH¶V VODWH EXW VKRZHG HYHQ PRUH success proportionally in the 
international and UK markets. The entire slate grossed $185.6 million worldwide, of which 
$35.6 million (19.2 per cent) was domestic revenue, $150 million (80.8 per cent) was 
international revenue and $62 million (33.4 per cent) was UK revenue. This trend was, 
however, distorted by a number of UK only releases (The Calcium Kid (2004), Mickybo and 
Me (2004)) or international only releases (Long Time Dead (2002), My Little Eye (2002), Ali 
G Indahouse (2002)). The outstanding success of the WT2 slate was Billy Elliot which grossed 
$109.2 million worldwide, followed by Shaun of the Dead at $30 million and Ali G Indahouse 
at $23.3 million. This was supported with relative success in the horror genre with Long Time 
Dead and My Little Eye taking $13.1 million and $6.8 million respectively. The rest of the 
FRPSDQ\¶V RXWSXW KRZHYHU IDLOHG WR UHDFK 2 million at the box office. Assessing the 
worldwide market for WoUNLQJ7LWOH¶VILOPVFellner explains: 
 
:H¶UH PDNLQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO ILOPV DV RSSosed to making domestic centric films. 
American film producers, predominantly, [make domestic centric films]. ,W¶V MXVW
because of who they DUHDQGZKHUHWKH\¶UHEDVHGDQGbecause of who we are and where 
ZH¶UHEDVHG,EHOLHYHWKDWLQD multiplex in Europe, if there are two good films and one 
has a slightly European sensibility and one has an American sensibility ± anGWKH\¶UH
both good ± I think people will choose the European one and in America the opposite 
« You try to make everybody feel that WKH\¶UHJHWWLQJZKDWWKH\ZDQWUltimately, in 
$PHULFD LW¶Vvery, very hard to make them feel like WKH\¶UHJHWWLQJZKDW WKH\ZDQW
because what they really want is what they really wDQWDQGWKDW¶V$PHULFDQILOPV They 
GRQ¶WZDQWIRUHLJQILOPVEven though our films are made in EnglisKWKH\¶UHSHUFHLYHG
as foreign films.20 
 
Significantly, the international market for Hollywood films began to overtake the domestic 
market by increasingly meaningful margins in the same period and thus began to more closely 
resemble the PDUNHWSURILOHWKDW:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VILOPs had realised since the 1990s. Between 
2000 and 2006, the international gross theatrical revenue of the major studios rose sharply from 
$8.26 billion to $16.3 billion, while domestic gross revenue grew modestly from $7.66 billion 
to $9.14 billion. The resulting swing in market share saw international rise from 52 to 64 per 
cent of the worldwide revenue while domestic fell from 48 to 36 per cent (MPAA 2007). This 
situation was one among several factors which prompted thH UHRUJDQLVDWLRQ RI 8QLYHUVDO¶V
international distribution and marketing infrastructure. In September 2005 Universal and 
Paramount announced the partial break-up of UIP wLWKWKHFRPSDQ\¶VILIWHHQODUJHUWHUUitories 
divided between the two studios and UIP remaining as a joint venture in 20 smaller territories 
(McNary 2005: 1). 
By the start of 2006, Snider had left Universal to become Co-Chair and CEO of 
Dreamworks and was replaced by Universal Vice Chair, Marc Shmuger, and David Linde, the 
co-FKDLURI8QLYHUVDO¶V µVSHFLDOW\¶ VLVWHUVWXGLR)RFXV)HDWXUHV6LJQLILFDQWO\6KPXJHUDQG 
Linde had respectively held responsibility for worldwide distribution and marketing at 
Universal and Focus and began to shift the strategic focus of the studio by increasingly linking 
production and marketing with a keen eye on expanding the international market. By January 
2007, two new theatrical distribution companies, Universal Pictures International (UPI) and 
Paramount Pictures International (PPI), launched their own distribution and marketing 
subsidiaries in the territories in which they had conceded former UIP companies to one other 
(Hollinger, 2007). In the same month, Shmuger and Linde rewarded Bevan and Fellner with 
new seven-year contracts, suggesting that Working Title would maintain its exclusive 
relationship with Universal until at least 2014 (ThoPSVRQDQG.HPS$V8QLYHUVDO¶V
international production company par excellence, Working Title was ideally situated to take 
DGYDQWDJHRIWKHVWXGLR¶Vnew international terrain. 
 
Conclusion 
 
:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VWUDQVLWLRQIURP3)(WR8QLYHUVDOLVDQDUUDWive of both continuity and change. 
The company succeeded in maintaining its status as a subsidiary of a multinational media 
conglomerate and continued to negotiate the key stages of gatekeeping with its successive 
parent companies. The most significant changes for Working Title were related to the scale of 
its new parent company and the resources which it provided. On one hand, Working Title 
remained an important VXSSOLHU RI µHYHQW¶ DQG µSRUWIROLR¶ ILOPV EXW ZDV RQH DPRQJ PDQ\
production companies under contract to Universal. On the other, UIP and later UPI/UIP 
maintained direct distribution and marketing in 35 territories in the burgeoning international 
market, alongside Universal-owned distribution in the ancillary markets of home video and 
television. Thus the Hollywood studio had the potential to expose :RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VILOPVWRD
vast worldwide audience. Such factors once DJDLQSRLQWWR:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VXQLTXH status as a 
British production company which is a component part of the contemporary Hollywood studio 
system and based both in London and Los Angeles.  
The primary focus of this article has been to examine the processes and structures which 
link Working Title to Universal and thus shape the creative and commercial ecology in which 
the company operates. As the centralised filter which connects the key stages of gatekeeping ± 
development, green-lighting and distribution ± the so-called µWHQ FROXPQ¶ KDV D SURIRXQd 
impact upon what is developed and produced and how it finds its audience. Significantly, the 
ten column is created by distribution and marketing personnel who respectively forecast 
revenue and produce marketing budgets for projects in development on a film-by-film, 
territory-by-territory and platform-by-platform basis. Inevitably, such forecasting evaluates the 
worldwide commercial prospects of films in development based upon the historical success or 
failure of comparable films. At one level such assessments are about form, particularly the 
market values ascribed to creative elements such as genre, production values and star actors. 
At another level they are about content, and the market values ascribed to certain 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRI%ULWDLQDQGµ%ULWLVKQHVV¶ 
The evidence for such claims is, of course, to be found in an assessment of Working 
7LWOH¶V RXWput. In the period under study, the comedy ± and more specifically the romantic 
comedy ± became E\IDUWKHFRPSDQ\¶VPRVWIUHTXently produced and commercially successful 
genres. In turn, scholarship about the Working Title rom-com in particular has highlighted the 
dominant versions of Britain DQGµ%ULWLVKQHVV¶RUPRUHW\SLFDOO\ England and Englishness) 
which these films offer including, among other things, a preoccupation with white middle- and 
upper-class characters and idyllic metropolitan locations. Such representations are not, of 
course, the sole preserve RI:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶V films and have an H[WHQVLYHSUHVHQFHLQ%ULWDLQ¶V
canonical literature, theatre and film. Ultimately, this version of the nation serves a similar 
function to genre, production values and stars insofar as it also constitutes a marker of audience 
recognition and, potentially, popular appeal. While the output of WT2 succeeded in offering 
more regionally and socially diverse representations of Britain alongside diminished 
production values and star appeal, most of these films did not succeed in securing a significant 
audience and the company was shuttered. Thus the versions of Britain and Britishness that 
persists in the media ecology of the Hollywood studio system are those which most closely 
conform to the dominant representations of the nation already in circulation. The audience for 
VXFKµFXOWXUDOO\%ULWLVK¶UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV LQ:RUNLQJ7LWOH¶VRXWSXW LVKRZHYHU ODUJHO\ to be 
IRXQGLQWKHFRPSRVLWHµLQWHUQDWLRQDO¶PDUNHWSODFHRIZKLFKWKHUK is by some measure the 
largest national component. Rather than takLQJ D µFXOWXUDO GHWRXU¶ WKURXJK WKH $merican 
market, the rest of the world is arguably making an excursion into the British market, albeit 
aboard a Hollywood tour bus. 
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